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Abstract
Operational risk quantification requires dealing with data sets which often present ex-
treme values which have a tremendous impact on capital computations (VaR). In order to
take into account these effects we use extreme value distributions, and propose a two pattern
model to characterize loss distribution functions associated to operational risks: a lognormal
on the corpus of the severity distribution and a Generalized Pareto Distribution on the right
tail. The threshold from which the model switches form a scheme to the other one is obtained
using a bootstrap method. We use an extension of the Peak-over-threshold method to fit the
GPD and the EM algorithm to estimate the lognormal distribution parameters. Through
the VaR, we show the impact of the GPD estimation procedure on the capital requirements.
Besides, our work points out the importance of the building’s choice of the information set
by practitioners to compute capital requirements and we exhibit some incoherences with the
actual rules. Particularly, we highlight a problem arising from the granularity which has
recently been mentioned by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision.
Keywords: Operational risk - Generalized Pareto distribution - Pickands estimate - Hill es-
timate - Expectation Maximization algorithm - Monte Carlo simulations - VaR.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is operational risks quantification following the Basel Advanced Mea-
surement Approach (AMA) (BIS (2004)). This proposal of the Basel committee binds banks
to carry out their own models on internal data sets to evaluate amounts of capital necessary to
face these risks.
In this paper, we focus on the computation of the loss distribution function (LDF) (Frachot
et al. (2001), Guégan and Hassani (2009)) which is currently used to evaluate this kind of risks
(Cruz (2004), Chernobai et al. (2007) and Shevchenko (2011)). We compute it as a convolution
of two distribution functions, one modeling the frequencies of the losses and the other one their
severity. Following the literature, we restrict to a Poisson distribution for the frequencies, and
in this paper we focus on the estimation of the severity distribution.
The objective of the paper is to model the severities using a class of distributions which take
into account the large losses: the Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD). In order to capture
extreme values on the first hand, and on the other hand the multimodality observed in oper-
ational risk data sets1, we propose to model the severities as a mix of two distributions: one
characterizing the most important losses denoted cauda using the GPD (Pickands (1975), Davis
and Resnick (1988) and Embrechts et al. (1997)), and another one on the remaining data corre-
sponding to the central part of the distribution or corpus. A characteristic of the GPD stands in
the determination of a threshold denoted u permitting to define the data set on which the distri-
bution will be adjusted. Therefore, the estimation of this threshold is the core of this paper: we
highlight the influence of the choice of the threshold on the computation of the capital require-
ment. Then, once the threshold has been identified we need to estimate the parameters of the
two distributions, for instance the lognormal and the GPD. Using several estimation methods,
we also exhibit the influence of these ones on the computation of univariate capital requirement.
Finally, considering the obtained results, we discuss the problem of granularity which is the main
problem in the construction of operational risk data sets (or Basel matrix).
1We used data from BPCE on the French Caisse d’Epargne perimeter.
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The paper is organized as follows: Section two introduces the data set, Section three presents the
theoretical framework, Section four describes the estimation of the threshold and the construction
of the LDF and Section five is devoted to capital charge estimations. A sixth Section concludes.
2 The Data Set
The data set we use is organized into the Basel Matrix (BIS (2001)). In its first level of granular-
ity, this matrix is made up of 56 cases - 8 business lines ("b") × 7 event types ("e")2. Nevertheless,
each event type might be decomposed in several elements. For example, the "external fraud"
event may be shared in two items - "Theft and Fraud" and "Systems Security" (second level of
granularity). In a third level, the element "Theft and Fraud" may be split in several compo-
nents: "Theft/Robbery", "Forgery" and "Check kiting". After a deep analysis, we observe that
the kind of losses expected from a fraud with a credit card does not correspond to losses caused
by someone hacking the system for instance; nevertheless they are in the same cell. Therefore,
considering the largest level of granularity, we could face multimodal empirical distributions.
Consequently, the methods used to model the losses depend on the granularity level choice.
This choice might have a tremendous impact on capital requirement computations. Besides,
we face a trade-off between quantity of data and robustness of the estimations: indeed, if the
quantity of data is not sufficient, we cannot go lower in the granularity; on the another hand
the ensuing empirical distribution is therefore an aggregate of various natures of data and the
estimation of this last empirical distribution can be source of unusable or unrealistic results.
The previous paragraph dealt with the multimodality and the granularity problems. These
points have a corollary: an extreme value is a relative concept, which require a referent. For
example, a card fraud of 50000e is an extreme value compared to an average loss of 300e while
a rogue trading of 50000e is not an extreme value when we know that the average loss represents
several millions. Furthermore, we do not define an extreme value as an "extremely" rare event.
Therefore, one can use a GPD approach as the one presented below to model the severities.
2The business lines are corporate finance, trading & sales, retail banking, commercial banking, payment and
settlement, agency services, asset management and retail brokerage. The event types are internal fraud, external
fraud, employment practices & workplace safety, clients, products & business practices, damage to physical assets,
business disruption & system failures and execution, delivery & process management.
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3 The theoretical framework
The Loss Distribution Function (LDF) G (whose density is denoted g) is a mixture of two
distributions, the frequency distribution p and the severity distribution F (whose density is f):
G =
∞∑
γ=0
p(γ)F ∗γ(x; θ), x > 0, G = 0, x = 0, (3.1)
where ∗γ is the γ-order operator of convolution, θ a vector of parameters. The density is given
by,
g =
∞∑
γ=0
p(γ)f⊗γ(x; θ), x > 0. (3.2)
The severity distribution, on which we focus in the current paper, is defined as a mixture of a
lognormal distribution on the corpus, and a GPD on the right tail (cauda). The GPD density
is:
fGPD(x;u, β, ξ)) =

1
β
(
1 + ξ x−uβ
)−1−( 1
ξ
)
, if x ≥ u, 1 + ξ( (x−u)β ) > 0, β > 0
1
β
(
1− x−uβ
)
, if x ≥ u, ξ = 0
, (3.3)
where u ∈ R∗+ is the threshold, β ∈ R∗ is the scale parameter and ξ ∈ R the shape parameter.
Therefore, the severity density in our model is as follows:
f(x;u, β, ξ, µ, σ) =

f (corpus)(x;µ, σ), if x < u
f (cauda) = 11−∫ u0 f (corpus)(x;µ,σ)dx × fGPD(x;u, β, ξ)), if x ≥ u
, (3.4)
where, µ and σ are the lognormal distribution parameters, and fGPD is the density introduced
in (3.3).
Remark 3.1. Modeling both the losses below and above the threshold has two major advantages:
• It enables specifying the threshold regarding a model, i.e. the quantile obtained empirically
is different from the quantile we have theoretically.
• It permits creating a whole distribution we will be able to use in a multivariate approach
(Guégan and Hassani (2010)).
In order to estimate the parameters of the distribution (3.4), we need first to estimate the
threshold u. To do so, we carry out a bootstrap method (Hall (1990), Danielsson et al. (2001))
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for which we give practical solutions in the next Section. Once u has been found, ξ and β have
to be estimated, therefore we implement a method based on the Anderson-Darling statistics
(Luceno (2006)). This method maximizes the following relationship to estimate the parameters:
A2n = n
∫ ∞
−∞
(F (GPD)(x;u, β, ξ)− Sn(x))2
F (x;u, β, ξ)(1− F (GPD)(x;u, β, ξ)))dF
(GPD)(x;u, β, ξ), (3.5)
where, F (GPD)(x;u, β, ξ) is the cumulative distribution function of a GPD whose density is
given by (3.3), and n ∈ R+ the number of observations. In the fifth Section, we compare this
method with other traditional estimators and we show that this approach provides interesting
results. Then, as we assumed a lognormal distribution to model the central part of the sever-
ity distribution (3.4), we implement an Expectation-Maximization algorithm (Dempster et al.
(1977), McLachlan and Krishnan (1997)) to estimate the parameters of the truncated distribu-
tion. Finally, the λ parameter of the Poisson distribution p(γ;λ) is estimated using maximum
likelihood method. As soon as we have estimated the whole set of parameters, we can build
the loss distribution function (3.1) using a convolution method based on the modified Monte
Carlo Algorithm given in Appendix B (Fishman (1996), Cruz (2002), Peters et al. (2007) and
Shevchenko (2010)), and compute a VaR (Riskmetrics (1993), Artzner et al. (1999)),
V aR(1−α)% = inf(x ∈ R : P (X > x) ≤ (1− α)), (3.6)
where, X is a random variable characterized by the previous LDF, and α = 0.1.
The Figure 1 illustrates the method introduced in this section through a simulation experiment.
We exhibit the histogram of the Historical LDF. The black line corresponds to a LDF mixing a
Poisson distribution and a lognormal severity. The associated 99.9% VaR is pointed out by ∆.
The dashed line represents a LDF mixing a Poisson distribution and a multiple pattern severity
distribution (lognormal-GPD given by (3.4)) using the Monte Carlo algorithm described in Ap-
pendix B. The corresponding VaR is represented by a +. The right graph focuses on the right
tail of the LDFs described in this paragraph. This figure highlights the fact that this method
enables thickening up the right tail of the LDF.
Remark 3.2. Drawing a parallel between this two-behavior approach with other methods such
as using g-and-h distributions (Peters and Sisson (2006), Dutta and J. (2007) and Degan et al.
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(2007)), we conclude that it does not exist a method which supplant the others. Trying the g-
and-h distribution to model some of our data sets, we had most of the time bad fitting results
or unrealistic capital charges, nevertheless in some particular cases the flexibility offered by this
distribution could be a reliable solution to model multimodal severity distributions. The method
presented in this paper, especially when we have enough data above the threshold and as soon as
the goodness-of-fit test validates the distribution, may be a powerful alternative.
4 Discussion around the threshold "u" of the GPD
In this section, we focus on the way to determine an efficient threshold u consistent with the
specific data set we work with, that is to say operational risks losses. In order to solve this prob-
lem, we assume that we observe a data set X = (X1, ..., Xn), and we denote X = (X(1), ..., X(n))
its order statistics, We first estimate the parameter ξ of the GPD (3.3) with the whole sample
using the traditional Hill estimator (Hill (1975)):
ξˆn(k) =
1
k
k∑
i=1
logX(n−i+1) − logX(n−k), (4.1)
k being the number of losses above the threshold. Thus, by the way we introduce a direct
relationship between k and u. Indeed, once we have k we have the threshold and vice versa.
We first determine k using the Hill estimate (4.1) and then implement a bootstrap method to
obtain u. The different steps are the following:
1. We plot ξˆn(k) with respect to k, as in Figure 2.
2. As soon as we detect a change in the plot pattern ("break"3) as in Figure 2 we build an
information subset X1 (size n1) containing this break and the values above it. For example,
in Figure 2 we heuristically determine a break at the value 100 e which corresponds to
the initial value of the subsample. Using the values in X1 we determine the parameter k1
minimizing the following criterion:
AMSE(k1) := E(ξˆn1(k1)− ξ)2 (4.2)
3The break is determined empirically by finding a change in the slop.
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3. In the relation (4.2), the parameter ξ is unknown and we estimate it bootstrapping ξˆn1(k1)
as follows. From the set previous X1, we draw J (J ∈ N) subsamples with replacement
of size n2 (n2 < n1), (X(j)1 , ..., X
(j)
n2 ), j = 1, ..., J . Their corresponding order statistics are
(X(j)(1) , ..., X
(j)
(n2)) and the corresponding bootstrapped Hill estimate of ξˆn1(k1) from X1 is
equal to,
ξˆn2(k2) =
1
k2
k2∑
i=1
logX(n2−i+1) − logX(n2−k2), k2 = 1, ..., n2, (4.3)
where
X l =
1
J
J∑
j=1
X
(j)
(l) , l = 1, ..., n2. (4.4)
4. Now, replacing ξ by ξˆn2(k2) in (4.2), we minimize the following criterion with respect to
k2.
ÂMSE(k2) := E(ξˆn1(k1)− ξˆn2(k2))2. (4.5)
5. Then, given (k1, k2), and following Hall (1982; 1990) we estimate4 the threshold u by,
u =
⌈
k2 ∗
(
n1
n2
) 2
3
⌉
. (4.6)
In order to implement the previous methodology, we need to pay attention to the following
points:
1. If an obvious pattern change (from erratic to linear for example) is observed in the repre-
sentation of ξˆn(k) with respect to k (Step 1), we can directly read u on the graph.
2. In the step 4, k1 is fixed. In practice, we can hesitate between several k1-values, denoted(
k11, ..., k
Λ
1
)
, Λ ∈ N, which means that for each k(j)1 , j = 1, ...,Λ, we obtain a k2-value de-
noted k(j)2 . For each couple (k
(j)
1 , k
(j)
2 ), we choose the k
(j)
2 -value, for which the relationship
(4.5) is the "‘most stable"’, and therefore, we compute the criteria (4.5) for d successive
values of k2 taken around k(j)2 . In that case the parameter k2 is obtained minimizing:
φ(k(j)2 , d) =
√√√√ d∑
i=1
(
M
(j)
1 −M∗(j)i
)2
, j = 1, ...,Λ, (4.7)
where, M (j)1 ≡ ÂMSE(k(j)2 ) is obtained from (4.5) for each k(j)2 , and M∗(j)i is computed
using the i value around k(j)2 , i = 1, ..., d.
4We are only working on a part of the initial sample, it is necessary to adjust k2 to the whole data set.
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Figure 2: Using the 610 highest values of the Basel case (Retail Banking; Damage to Physical
Assets) of 2007, we represent the Hill estimates considering thresholds varying between 39.2 and
7000 e. The graph becomes roughly stable around the value 180, but even if we are able to
identify the zone in which the threshold would stand, we have not yet an exact value, thus to
estimate u, we define the set X1 from the value 100 e, thus X1 contains 290 data.(Upper and
lower dashed lines represents a 95% confidence interval.)
3. If we cannot interpret the Hill plot (Step 1), either because the data set is too unstable or
too stable, we cannot use the previous algorithm, therefore, we use the whole information
set X, and follow the method developed in Danielsson et al. (2001) to estimate the ξ
parameter (this method does not require an a priori value of the threshold). We estimate
ξ by:
ξ˜n(k) =
1
k
∑k
i=1(logX(n−i+1) − logX(n−k))2
2ξˆn(k)
. (4.8)
For a certain5 n2, we bootstrap ξ˜n(k) which appears in relationship (4.8) following the
step 3 of the previous algorithm to create ξ˜n2(k2), where the parameter k2 is obtained
5A short algorithm providing the optimal n2 is given in Danielsson et al. (2001).
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minimizing,
A˜MSE(k2) := E(ξˆn2(k2)− ξ˜n2(k2))2. (4.9)
Then for a given k2, u is equal to:
u = (k2)
2
k3
(
(log k2)2
(2 logn2 − log k2)2
) logn2−log k2
logn2
, (4.10)
where k3 is obtained exactly as k2 with n3 =
n22
n
.
4. Shevchenko and Temnov (2009) suggest the use of a time varying threshold. In the current
paper, we use a static methodology, nevertheless it would be interesting to integrate dy-
namics in the process of estimation. To do so, a possibility would be to use the dynamics
of the severity data set given for instance by the incidents’ amounts and their occurrence
dates. In that case, the results would take into account the behavior changes in the risk
faced through time and adjust with the state of nature they are currently in (crises, boom
etc.).6
5 Capital Requirement
We applied the previous methodology to real operational risks data. We use two data sets
denoted X(1) and X(2).
• The set X(1) represents the severity of the business line "Retail Banking" and the event
type "Business Disruption & System Failure and Execution" for the year 2007.
• The set X(2) represents the severity of the business line "Payment & Settlement" and the
event type "Delivery, Execution and Process Management" for the year 2006.
Their statistics are given in Table 1. We deduce that their corresponding empirical severity
distributions are asymmetric (right skewed) and leptokurtic. This statement strengthens our
decision to implement a method which cares about extreme values in the distributions.
6Nevertheless in the current paper, this methodology cannot be considered because we do not have the cor-
responding information set. Besides, in Guégan and Hassani (2011) we dealt with a dynamic threshold using a
extreme distribution (Fisher and Tippett (1928)) with another data set.
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Moments X(1) X(2)
Mean 958.4922 1265.871
Standard Deviation 5010.661 10852.48
Skewness 29.84618 10.62595
Kurtosis 1163.478 119.5531
Table 1: First four moments of the two data sets X(1) and X(2). The third order empirical
moment is non null and the fourth order empirical moment is far from 3.
In order to calibrate the appropriate loss distribution function on each data set, we use a Poisson
distribution to model the frequency data. In the current paper, we did not challenge the choice
of a Poisson distribution to model the frequency as the gain obtained from a continuous approx-
imation or the use of another theoretical distribution has almost negligible impact on capital
computation. Therefore, estimating the λ parameters of the Poisson distribution by maximum
likelihood method, we get λ(1) = 2653 and λ(2) = 1292 respectively on the sets X(1) and X(2).
To fit the severities, we tried several usual distributions suggested in the literature, but the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejected all (Table 6). Therefore, we continue our exercise and focus
on the estimation of the threshold. To estimate the threshold u of the GPDs in the relation
(3.4), we define two new sets X(1)1 an X
(2)
1 , following the notations introduced in the previous
section. Their sizes are respectively n(1)1 = 531 and n
(2)
1 = 194. When we bootstrap the data,
we used respectively two sets of size n(1)2 = 266 and n
(2)
2 = 97. The resulting thresholds are
u(1) = 1645.07 and u(2) = 179. They imply respectively 191 and 315 data above these thresholds.
We denote X(GPD1) and X(GPD2) the two corresponding data sets on which we fit the GPDs.
We estimate the parameters ξ and β of the GPDs defined in (3.4) using the method introduced
by (Luceno (2006)) given in (3.5), denoting this method M1. We also consider three other alter-
native estimation methods to estimate these parameters in order to check their impact on VaR
computations. These ones are respectively the Pickands method (M2) (Pickands (1975)), the
Hill method (M3) (Hill (1975)), and the Maximum Likelihood method (M4).
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We provide in Table 2 the estimations of GPDs parameters (with their standard deviation in
brackets) obtained for both sets, using these four methods. Then we estimate the parameters
of the lognormal distributions for the sets X(1) −X(GPD1) and X(2) −X(GPD2) and the results
are provided in Table 3.
Method X(1) X(2)
β ξ β ξ
M1 136.678 2.085 932.854 0.767
(36.91) (0.687) (83.71) (0.101)
M2 133.092 2.173 682.615 1.144
(39.70) (0.361) (160.70) (0.266)
M3 171.5 1.581 1007 0.66
(26.19) (0.668) (214.36) (0.228)
M4 159.535 1.948 904.087 0.827
(27.3755) (0.21) (92.31) (0.097)
Table 2: Estimations of the GPD’s parameters ξ and β given in (3.3), using four methods
respectively for u(1) = 1645.07 and u(2) = 179. We provide in brackets the standard deviations
computed by bootstrapping.
X(1) −X(GPD1) X(2) −X(GPD2)
µ = 5.702144 σ = 1.103373 µ = 3.593098 σ = 1.510882
(0.07134) (0.03016) (0.04112) (0.02576)
Table 3: Estimations of the parameters of the lognormal distributions fitted on the data sets
X(1) −X(GPD1) and X(2) −X(GPD2). Standard deviation are provided in brackets.
As soon as all the parameters have been estimated, we implement a Monte Carlo algorithm with
a million of iterations to build G, and we use it to compute a 99.9% VaR which provides the
required amount of capital. Table 4 provides the VaRs of the set X(2) using the four estima-
tion methods to estimate the threshold. We observe miscellanous amounts, varying from 5 725
341 euros to 538 480 990 euros. This last result is obtained from a distribution whose mean
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is infinite (the parameter ξ is greater than 1). This result points that the choice of the distri-
bution and the estimation procedure are crucial for the VaR computations. The M1 method
has the advantage to maximize the goodness-of-fit of the GPD and insures that the distribu-
tion cannot be statistically rejected. Therefore, one can argue that the VaR at 15 700 112 euros
could be a reasonnable value considering the information set we have, and the assumptions done.
We do not provide the VaRs for the set X(1) as the results we obtained imply a simulated VaR
multiplied by more than one hundred compared to the historical one. Here again, we can observe
that the underlying model has an infinite mean.
Analyzing the results and controlling every step of the method, we concluded that the difficulty
to obtain a "correct" and a "robust" model comes from the structure of the data set. Considering
that different kinds of data are mixed in a single set it appears difficult to fit an accurate dis-
tribution on the severities. In order to analyze the impact of the granularity strategy, it would
be interesting to split the data in multiple subsets whether the information sets sizes are large
enough. In that latter case the computed VaRs would reflect risks created by specific kinds of
risk, and finally aggregating them we could compare the results to the largest level of granularity.7
Method VaR
M1 15 700 112 euros
M2 538 480 990 euros
M3 5 725 341 euros
M4 27 944 558 euros
Table 4: VaR estimations for u = 179, µ = 5.681191 and σ = 1.081609 for the data set X(2).
Estimations have a tremendous impact on the VaRs. In this table, these ones may differ by
9405%.
Finally we want to notice the influence of the threshold on the estimation of the GPD’s param-
eters β and ξ. This effect is due to the fact that the information set changed. We illustrate this
7We do not provide those results as we did not have the corresponding data sets.
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point providing estimates for five threshold values, for the set X(1) (Table 5). All the estimated
values are relevant despite a great instability. Thus the corresponding VaR and capital amount
would be different. All steps of the previous methodology: estimation of u, estimation of the
parameters ξ and β, methods of estimation play an important role in the computation of the
capital requirement.
Threshold u β Standard error β ξ Standard error ξ
1162.12 1110.8538 87.77 0.6026 0.06877
1608.27 946.6787 94.68 0.7924 0.09329
1645.07 904.087 92.31 0.827 0.09713
2021.48 1188.2956 155.48 0.9149 0.1397
2177.58 1385.5295 199.56 0.8879 0.14
Table 5: This table presents GPD’s parameters estimates and their standard errors for different
thresholds u for the data set X(2). Parameters are very sensitive to the threshold value.
15
Conclusion
In this paper, we focus on the estimation of the LDF used to estimate operational risks. We
highlight that the VaR computation depends on the method implemented. Therefore, a sharp
analysis of the LDF is essential, and even if the LDF is a convolution of two distinct distribu-
tions, the capital requirements seem particularly sensitive to the choice and the estimation of the
severity distribution. We present a new method to compute the severity distribution, splitting
it in two parts in order to better take into account the large losses. We use a GPD on the
right tail for which we provide innovative theoretical and practical solutions, and fit a lognormal
distribution on the remaining data. Then, to build the final LDF, we apply a new adapted
Monte Carlo algorithm. This method enables capturing at least two distinct behaviors in a
severity distribution, and sometimes a bit more if the multimodality is not too strongly marked.
We point out the importance of the Basel matrix construction and the so-called granularity effect.
Second, we underline the fact that once the threshold of the GPD has been found, the method
chosen to estimate GPD’s parameters tremendously impacts the VaR: it seems that this fact
has never been discussed before.
In our applications, we have been confronted to an important problem arising from the data
bases construction. Following the regulator, who demands to take into account the right tail
of the severity distribution to estimate the LDF, we sometimes obtained unrealistic VaRs (i.e.
equal to half the bank capitalization) due to infinite mean models. On the other hand, if we
do not care about the severity tail, we have negligible VaRs. Then, even if it seems reason-
able to follow regulator requirements, we point out two important facts: either the Bank are
overexposed to these risks or the data sets are badly built. We privilege the last point and ask
operational risks managers to pay attention to the large diversity of data origins. The correct
question is to propose another way for building the data sets used to compute operational risks
taking into account the difference which exists inside the different risk categories. It seems that
it has no sense to mix some risks together. In our knowledge, this problem has not yet been
discussed and the regulators need to reexamine risk typology and data sets granularity on which
are computed operational risk capital requirements.
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The method we provide enables to compute capital requirements with respect to Basel accords,
so, we strictly stick to them. In this paper we focused on the effectiveness of the proposed
method on an operational standpoint, however, other research tracks can extend the results
developed in this paper. Even if in this paper we focus on the VaR computation to obtain
the corresponding capital requirement, it will be interesting to use other risks measures, for
instance the Expected Shortfall (ES) measure, and analyze their impact on the computation
of the associated capital requirement. The use of the ES is not required by the regulator but
it would be interesting because it is a coherent risk measure (Artzner et al. (1999), Extensions
are proposed in Guégan and Hassani (2011)). On the other hand there are alternatives to the
Monte Carlo method to calculate the LDF (Luo and Shevchenko (2009), Guégan and Hassani
(2009)) permitting to improve the computation speed that could be investigated. Finally, to
take into account the effect of the tail behavior, we focus in this paper on the Generalized
Pareto Distribution, nevertheless other alternatives could be considered, e.g. the extreme value
distributions defined in the Fisher-Tippett theorem (Fisher and Tippett (1928)), the g-and-h
distributions, or multivariate methods through the extreme value copulas (Gudendorf and Segers
(2010)). All these subjects will be discussed in companion papers.
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A Traditional distributions
X(1) X(2)
Distribution Statistics P-value Distribution Statistics P-value
lognormal 0.1498 < 2.2e-16 lognormal 0.1066 3.552e-13
(µ = 5.86, σ = 1.25) (µ = 3.69,σ = 1.78)
exponential 0.306 < 2.2e-16 exponential 0.731 < 2.2e-16
(η = 1.04e− 03) (η = 7.9e− 04)
Weibull 0.2035 < 2.2e-16 Weibull 0.2238 < 2.2e-16
(β = 652.79, ξ = 0.704) (β = 91.82, ξ = 0.41)
Gumbel 0.2833 < 2.2e-16 Gumbel 0.4904 < 2.2e-16
(ν = 392.46, ξ = 680.01) (ν = 116.16, ξ = 1191.18)
Fréchet 0.1267 < 2.2e-16 Fréchet 0.0929 4.072e-10
(ν = 238.58, β = 222.87 (ν = 21.73, β = 28.49
ξ = 0.67) ξ = 1.14)
Table 6: Goodness-of-fit of the presented theoretical distributions to the sets X(1) and X(2): the
parameters have been estimated by maximum likelihood and we have chosen the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic. The p-values are all lower than 1%. It’s not satisfactory. Considering
goodness-of-fit test results, it is not possible to state that a distribution is better than another
to model the losses.
21
B An adapted Monte Carlo algorithm
1. We simulate n realizations of the frequency distribution, q1, ..., qn, n ≥ 1000000.
2. For each qi, i = 1, · · · , n, we simulate qi values of the central distribution, (s1, ..., sqi), and
compare them to the threshold:
(a) If sj < u, ∀j ∈ [1, qi] we keep them.
(b) If sj ≥ u, we count the number of exceedences, (z1, ..., zn) for each frequency qi and
for each i, we draw zi realizations of the GPD, (s(GPD)1 , ..., s
(GPD)
zi ).
3. Finally, we have Gi =
∑qi
j=1(sj + s
(GPD)
j ), a realization of the LDF, i = 1, ..., n.
4. The set (G1, ..., Gn) provides an empirical approximation of the LDF.
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